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Carrying a Piece of Congo in Our Pockets: Global 
Complicity to Congo’s Sexual Violence and the 
Conflict Minerals Trade 
Anne DeVoe1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world’s thirst for Congo’s resources has been “the vilest 
scramble for loot that ever disfigured the history of human 
conscience.”  
—Joseph Conrad.2 
A. Recent Incidents of Mass Rape in Eastern Congo. 
Inside the North Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) is the vast and remote Walikale territory.3 Walikale has been the 
scene of much fighting during the current armed conflict in Congo,4 and 
also contains some of the most lucrative mining sites in the region.5 While 
there are United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces dispatched in Walikale, 
there is a rebel group called the  Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR) that “maintains a strong presence in the territory, pillaging 
                                                            
1 A sincere thanks to Yair Inspektor for being a supportive and enthusiastic groupie, and 
to S.D., L.D., and W.D. This article was a difficult journey, and I could not have done it 
without all of your help. 
2 Joseph Conrad, Geography and Some Explorers, in LAST ESSAYS 14 (Richard Curle 
ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1926), available at 
http://www.conradfirst.net/view/image?id=17415. 
3 Olivia Caeymaex, Field Distpatch: Walikale, ENOUGH: THE PROJECT TO END 
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/field-dispatch-walikale. 
4 In this article, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is referred to as both 
“Congo” and “the Congo.” There is no mention in this article of the Republic of the 
Congo, a separate country bordering the DRC, so any reference to Congo or the Congo 
refers to the DRC with the capital of Kinshasa. 
5 Caeymaex, supra note 3. 
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and looting villages with a focus on the strategic mining sites of Bisie and 
Omate.”6 In addition to the grave threat that the FDLR poses to civilians, 
there are other  rebel groups, called Mai-Mai, that terrorize the population.7 
In July and August 2010, both the Mai-Mai and the FDLR raped more 
than 300 women and children in Walikale territory.8 Specifically, it appears 
that three groups worked together—FDLR troops, a group of Mai-Mai 
rebels, plus a third armed group—to attack thirteen villages and rape 235 
women, fifty-two girls, fifteen men, and three boys.9 These attacks occurred 
despite the Congolese government’s deployment of thousands of soldiers to 
the region to enforce a presidential moratorium on mining and to restore 
order.10 Even more troubling, UN peacekeepers reported that Congolese 
army troops were themselves committing mass rape, killing civilians, and 
looting villages during the summer of 2010.11 
These two separate incidents of mass rape perpetrated against the same 
group of civilians caught the international community’s attention. The UN 
Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged that 
the UN had failed the victims in Walikale territory.12 Margot Wallström, the 
UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence Against Women in 
Conflict, called on the DRC government to investigate and to hold any 
perpetrators accountable.13 On October 5, 2010, Indian UN peacekeepers 
arrested a Mai-Mai militia leader whose troops allegedly participated in the 
rapes.14 Although human rights groups had named the FDLR as the main 
perpetrator of mass rape in the region, the arrest of the Mai-Mai leader set 
                                                            
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Nicole Johnston, UN: DR Congo Troops Committing Rape, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 15, 
2010), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/10/2010101423546470319.html. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. 
14 Id. 
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an important precedent of action.15 According to Ms. Wallström, it is only 
when military commanders understand that they may be turned in for 
commissioning or condoning rapes that a positive shift can occur in the 
battle to end impunity for the perpetrators of mass rape in Congo.16 
B. Congo and the Exploitation of Conflict Minerals 
In the current conflict in Congo, it is mineral-wealth that provides armed 
groups with the money and resources to wage war on civilians and other 
groups.17 These groups fund their violence with the sale of conflict 
minerals.18 Conflict minerals are minerals that are sold by armed groups to 
fund violence and insurrection.19 There are four main minerals mined in the 
Congo: tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold—and the electronics industry is 
one of the main buyers of these minerals.20 In September 2010, after UN 
troops reported that Congolese government troops had committed mass rape 
against civilians in Walikale, the president of DRC, Joseph Kabila, 
announced a mineral export ban on the territory and a halt to the mining of 
all minerals from three provinces in eastern Congo—North Kivu, South 
Kivu, and Maniema.21 
While President Kabila’s temporary ban was a positive step towards 
policy reform on conflict minerals, a ban alone cannot terminate armed 
conflict in Congo “unless it is accompanied by concrete Congolese army 
reform, a certification process for mineral exports, and opportunities for 
                                                            
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See Conflict Minerals, GLOBAL WITNESS, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-minerals (last visited Oct. 20, 
2011) [hereinafter Conflict Minerals]. 
18 See id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Matt Brown, Congo’s Ban on Mining an Incomplete Solution to Conflict Minerals, 
Says Enough Project, ENOUGH: THE PROJECT TO END GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.enoughproject.org/news/congos-ban-mining-
incomplete-solution-conflict-minerals-says-enough-project.  
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peaceful development” in the region.22 In order for a certification process 
for conflict minerals to be effective, companies that trade and buy conflict 
minerals must ensure that their supply chains are not connecting and 
contributing to the armed groups that take over mines and instigate violence 
in Congo.23 In July 2010, the United States passed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law. A provision within 
this law requires companies that are registered in the United States to report 
the steps they take to certify that their mineral supply chains are not funding 
armed groups in eastern Congo.24 
The armed groups that control mines and profit from the sale of conflict 
minerals exploit the Congolese civilian population by enforcing systems of 
illegal taxation on every worker, merchant, and visitor who works or lives 
near the mines.25 While taxation is one way to control civilian populations, 
for these armed groups rape is a more effective “tool” than taxation. They 
systematically use rape as a tool of war to terrorize and control Congolese 
civilians.26 “Systematic rape has evolved over the last dozen years of war in 
the Congo as a tool of . . . social control” that armed groups can use against 
civilians in order to terrorize and dominate them.27 One Congolese woman 
activist explained it this way: “[w]hen they rape the women, they send a 
message to the men and the community that they have the power and the 
                                                            
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 See id (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 
4173, 111th Cong. § 1502(e)(4)(A) (2010)). 
25 The trade of conflict minerals has helped fund the war in Congo that began in 1996 
and that, despite an official ending in 2006, never truly ended in the eastern part of the 
country. See Lydia Polgreen, Congo’s Riches, Looted by Renegade Troops, N.Y. TIMES  
(Nov. 16, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/world/africa/16congo.html?_r=2&ref=todayspaper
&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin&oref=slogin. 
26 See JOHN PRENDERGAST WITH DON CHEADLE, THE ENOUGH MOMENT: FIGHTING TO 
END AFRICA’S WORST HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 182 (2010). 
27 Id. 
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control. It is designed to humiliate and to spread HIV/AIDS.”28 This theory 
is further supported by the dramatic increase in male rape cases since 
2009.29 In Congolese culture, a man’s identity is closely connected to power 
and control; thus, sexual violence against men is an extremely powerful tool 
that armed groups use to demean and control Congolese communities.30 
C. Mass Rape as a Tool of War and Its Current Use and Impact in 
Congolese Society31 
Armies and governments have used mass rape in armed conflict for 
centuries for various reasons. Often, armed groups use rape as a weapon in 
order to demoralize, control, oppress, and eradicate civilian populations and 
to reward soldiers. According to Ms. Wallström, “[t]he mass rapes in 
Walikale demonstrate a nexus between the illicit exploitation of natural 
resources by armed elements and patterns of sexual violence.”32 The 
communities in Congo that are near lucrative mining areas are at 
particularly high risk of attack because of the competition over mining 
interests.33 In Congo, the armed groups struggling to maintain control over 
the mines are using rape as a tool to assert their control of both civilians and 
mines.34 
                                                            
28 Id. at 183. 
29 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Symbol of Unhealed Congo: Male Rape Victims, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/world/africa/05congo.html?scp=1&sq=unhealed+c
ongo&st=nyt. 
30 See id. 
31 Mass rape has been used as a tool and tactic in war for centuries, and is documented in 
ancient texts such as the Bible. For example, Moses said, “Now therefore, kill every male 
among the little ones, and kill every woman who has known man by lying with him. But 
all the young girls who have not known man by lying with him, keep alive for 
yourselves.” Numbers 31:17–18 (World English Bible), available at 
http://worldebible.com/numbers/31.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
32 GLOBAL WITNESS, THE HILLS BELONG TO THEM: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ACTION ON CONGO’S CONFLICT MINERALS TRADE 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.projectcongo.org/images/The_hill_belongs_to_them141210_1_.pdf. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. 
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In the Congo, the systematic rape used to control the population has 
crippled economic development as well as women’s efforts for social 
equality.35 If a woman is raped, she is often rejected by both her husband 
and her family; additionally, she is marginalized by her community and 
stigmatized by Congolese society.36 This situation frequently leaves women 
without income or resources to recover from the rape, unable to work, or to 
feed and maintain themselves and their children.37 Congolese women are 
the backbone of the economic and social structure of the country, providing 
both the labor and the familial foundations of their culture.38 Thus, the mass 
rape of Congolese women for the past fourteen years has fractured these 
structures and impeded the country’s development.39 
D. Scope of this Discussion 
This article argues that, while there is no one solution that will end the 
systematic rape taking place in the Congo, there are realistic steps that the 
international community, the DRC government, and both local and 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can take in order to 
initiate effective change. It is not likely that the armed groups raping 
civilians in Congo have written orders or policies that explicitly state a rape 
strategy. While some groups verbally admit that their strategy involves 
mass rape,40 there is no paper trail documenting the connection between 
mass rape, control over mines in eastern Congo, and the conflict minerals 
trade. 
                                                            
35 See John Cookson, In Congo, “A Dead Rat is Worth More Than the Body of a 
Woman,” BIG THINK (Oct. 27, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://bigthink.com/ideas/24655?page=all. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. 
40 See Brianna Lee, Congo Soldiers on Why They Rape, NEED TO KNOW ON PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-need/congo-soldiers-on-why-they-
rape/4046/ (last modified Oct. 5, 2010, 10:09 AM). 
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This article argues that the connection between mass rape and conflict 
minerals does exist, and it explores the possible steps the global community 
can take to break this connection. The article is structured to give the reader 
a preliminary background of rape as a tool of war, and then to explore 
different methods to fight this strategy—first through legislation here in the 
United States and the possible use of international law, and then through 
legislative, judicial, and other peace-construction methods inside Congo. It 
is important to note that there is not just one solution to ending conflict in 
Congo. Rather than discourage action, the fact that there are several 
different solutions should compel action all the more—with the knowledge 
that we all have different roles to fill. 
Part II of this article briefly explores two separate histories: (1) the 
history of colonization in Congo and the pattern of resource exploitation for 
the benefit of a few and to the detriment of the Congolese people, and (2) 
the legal history of mass rape and its recent development in international 
law as its own separate, punishable crime of war. These separate histories 
connect with the international implications of the current use of mass rape 
to control and exploit Congo’s resource-wealth. Part II also examines how 
the recent developments in international law on sexual violence in conflict 
can be applied to Congo’s current situation. 
Part III of this article urges the effective implementation of the new US 
conflict minerals law as a key step to stop the current mass rape and killing 
of civilians in Congo. It should be supported, strengthened, and used to 
certify the “chain of custody”41 of conflict minerals in order to cut off 
funding to armed groups. Additionally, the international community should 
explore the possibility of holding companies legally accountable under 
international law for their complicity in the conflict minerals trade and their 
implicit support of mass rape in Congo. 
                                                            
41 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. § 1502(e)(4)(A) (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
111hr4173enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173enr.pdf. 
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Part IV of this article presses for the international community to support 
intra-national justice in the Congo through the creation of a tribunal, a truth 
and reconciliation commission, and an effective legislative and judicial 
system. Additionally, there are many local NGOs that are working to 
change the current situation by providing medical, economic, and 
empowerment assistance to victims of sexual violence in Congo. Because 
much of the world uses Congo’s resources and therefore contributes to its 
internal violence, the international community has a duty to help 
consolidate the efforts to achieve prevention of sexual violence and to work 
toward justice for individual victims and survivors of sexual violence. 
It is important to point out that the conflict in Congo involves a complex 
story intricately tied to many different groups, conflicts, and countries. The 
genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994, the politics and conflicts of 
Congo’s other neighboring countries, and the current complexities of 
politics in Congo itself—are intricately linked to the violence that occurs in 
the country today. While all of these factors have had a direct impact on the 
systemic sexual violence in Congo today, they are outside the scope of this 
discussion and will not be specifically addressed in this article. 
II. THE COLLISION OF SEPARATE HISTORIES: CONGO’S MINERAL 
EXPLOITATION, THE USE OF MASS RAPE IN ARMED CONFLICT, 
AND THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. History of the Colonization of Congo and Its Resources 
The history of colonization in Africa is long and violent. Yet, European 
colonization of the Congo between 1890 and 191042 stands out amidst the 
many atrocities that Europeans committed in the “Scramble for Africa.”43 
During that time, King Leopold II of Belgium enslaved the Congolese 
                                                            
42 See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, 
AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 5 (First Mariner Books ed. 1999). 
43 Id. at 26. 
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people in order to extract resources, mainly rubber and lumber. In the 
process of enslavement, the Belgians killed between five and eight million 
people.44 Despite the number of deaths, this prolonged massacre is not 
legally considered genocide because King Leopold intended to use the 
Congolese for slave labor and not to eradicate them. In 2006, the British 
Parliament submitted a motion to recognize King Leopold’s regime as 
genocide; however, despite having some support, the motion died in 
Parliament.45 
King Leopold laid claim to the Congo as the single shareholder of a 
private company called the International Association of the Congo.46 The 
United States was the first country to recognize the King’s claim in 1884, 
and, through the guise of “philanthropy” and “delivering civilization” to 
local populations, the King was able to kill, rape, steal land, sever hands and 
feet, shatter families, and orphan children for over twenty years.47 King 
Leopold’s strategy to exploit the Congo for its wealth of resources involved 
creating a private army, called the Force Publique (FP), which was led by a 
mixture of Belgian soldiers and soldiers from other European countries that 
were sent to gain a few years of combat experience.48 
One main task of the FP was to enslave the population in order to harvest 
rubber from jungle vines.49 Commonly, the FP would enter a village and 
capture the women, children, and elders and chain them up.50 The village 
men would then be forced to collect rubber from wild vines in order to meet 
a certain quota.51 The violence perpetrated by King Leopold’s colonizers 
                                                            
44 See id. at 3. 
45 Colonial Genocide and the Congo, 2005–06, EDM 2251, H.C. (2006)  (U.K.), 
available at 
http://edmi.parliament.uk/EDMi/EDMDetails.aspx?EDMID=30788&SESSION=875. 
46 See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 42, at 81. 
47 See id. at 293. 
48 See id. at 123, 127. 
49 See id. at 159–61. 
50 See id. at 161–62. 
51 See id. at 162–63. 
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against women was equally brutal compared to the exploitation of the 
Congo for its resources and the enslavement of its population. In 1895, a 
Belgian officer recorded in his journal that “[a]ll the soldiers want one (a 
woman). The sentries who are supposed to watch them unchain the prettiest 
ones and rape them.”52 
In 1908, due to an international outcry against the brutality in the Congo, 
Leopold handed over his private interests in his fiefdom to Belgium, and it 
became an official colony named the Belgian Congo.53 Though Leopold 
burned most of his records in 1908,54 his profits from twenty years of 
exploiting Congo can be estimated conservatively at around $1.1 billion in 
today’s dollars.55  
The end of King Leopold’s reign in the Congo did not end the 
exploitation of the Congo’s resources on a mass scale. In 1960, after more 
than a century of brutal colonization, the Belgian Congo became 
independent, and, soon after, civil war broke out.56 During the civil war, the 
democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was removed 
from power and, in a 1965 coup d’état backed by the United States, was 
replaced by General Mobutu Sese Seko (commonly known as General 
Mobutu).57 
General Mobutu, protected by the United States for being a reliable Cold 
War ally in Africa, ruled the Congo, which he renamed Zaire, for thirty-two 
                                                            
52 Id. at 162. 
53 See id. at 259. 
54 See id. at 294. 
55 Id. at 277. 
56 See Evan Luard, The Civil War in the Congo, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
OF CIVIL WARS 108 (Evan Luard ed., 1972). 
57 See id. at 112. Belgium and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked together to 
assassinate Lumumba in January 1961; forty-one years later, Belgium (but not the CIA) 
issued an apology to the Congo and asked for forgiveness for killing him. See Arnaud 
Zajtman, Lumumba Apology: Congo’s Mixed Feelings, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2002, 11:50 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1805546.stm. 
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years.58 As dictator, Mobutu profited handsomely from Congo’s rich 
mineral reserves.59 What he did not squander on his luxurious lifestyle, he 
stashed away in foreign bank accounts. When he finally fled the Congo in 
1996, he left behind a country in ruin—robbed of the even the most basic 
necessities.60 After Mobutu, the country renamed itself the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.61 
B. The Use of Mass Rape in Armed Conflict and Recent Shift in 
International Law 
The history of mass rape in armed conflict is long and violent. Yet, in 
recent decades, the organized use of rape as a weapon of war has 
increased.62 Systematic, organized rape was used to terrorize and “to carry 
out ethnic cleansing and genocidal campaigns in the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Darfur.”63 During the war in the 
former Yugoslavia, the Serbian military applied a strategy suggested “by 
psychological experts that concluded that Muslim communities can be 
undermined only if we aim our action at the point where religious and social 
structure is most fragile. We refer to the women, especially adolescents, and 
to the children.”64 
In Congo, rape is a very effective tool to humiliate, control, and 
undermine the population because of the stigma attached to it; women and 
                                                            
58 GÉRARD PRUNIER, AFRICA’S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, AND 
THE MAKING OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE 77 (2009). 
59 See Howard W. French, Anatomy of an Autocracy: Mobutu’s 32-Year Reign, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 17, 1997), 
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/051797zaire-mobutu.html. 
60 See id. One estimate of Mobutu’s accumulated wealth is £2.5 billion in British pounds 
(or just under $4 billion US dollars as of Dec. 2011). See David Pallister & Owen 
Bowcott, Bank to Shut Doors on Saudi Royal Cash, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2002), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/17/saudiarabia.davidpallister. 
61 See PRUNIER, supra note 58, at 134. 
62 PRENDERGAST WITH CHEADLE, supra note 26, at 181. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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girls who are raped are often subsequently rejected and marginalized or 
exiled by their communities.65 Often, husbands reject their wives when they 
discover that they have been raped, and families of husbands may reject a 
woman or girl if her husband has been killed.66 In a case documented by 
Human Rights Watch, Francine, a thirty-five-year-old woman and mother 
of six, was raped by three soldiers who then killed her husband in front of 
her.67 Subsequently, she was accused by her husband’s brothers “of being a 
traitor, an accomplice of the attackers,” and they told her she had become 
“everyone’s woman.”68 
Yet, despite the stigma of rape in most cultures, in the past twenty years 
women’s voices and perspectives have gained ground in the historical 
record, which is otherwise dominated by male accounts of sexual violence. 
There are several theories behind this shift, which has led to the emergence 
of a feminine perspective, including the increasing number of women in 
courtrooms, as legal activists, as reporters, and as authors writing 
analytically to make sense of rape from the vantage point of women.69 
Within this shift, the concepts of “marital rape” and “date rape” changed 
from unknown, undefined crimes into punishable acts of violence in some 
countries—which then exposed state and social systems that have 
perpetuated women’s marginalization.70 
Instances of women speaking out against mass rape are relatively new 
phenomenas. Women’s groups in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia were 
particularly successful in the 1990s in getting the news out about the mass 
                                                            
65 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO 64 (2002), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/congo0602.pdf. 
66 See id. at 64–65. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See Cynthia Enloe, Have the Bosnian Rapes Opened a New Era of Feminist 
Consciousness?, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
219, 222 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., Marion Faber trans., 1994). 
70 Id. at 222. 
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rape perpetrated by soldiers and governments, which was documented in 
women’s words and on their terms.71 In the Congo, there are women, men, 
and groups who are working with victims of sexual violence for their own 
sake, and who are working against the marginalization of women in an 
established male-dominated society. While this newly-established counter-
perspective is helpful, the activists’ fight is uphill. 
The mass rape of women in Bosnia in the early 1990s was not different 
from other organized rapes in history, in that male combatants sexually 
assaulted civilian women on a mass scale. What distinguished the mass rape 
in Bosnia was the perspective-shift of how it was reported—it was not just 
the conqueror’s voice telling the story. Women’s accounts and analyses of 
rape were reported worldwide and were documented by women’s 
organizations using international political feminist networks. When the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established, it 
was authorized to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. Rape was specifically listed as a crime against humanity in the 
statute.72 The work done to disseminate information about the atrocities that  
occurred in the former Yugoslavia created the framework for the ICTY to 
set a precedent for the prosecution of gender-related crimes.73 
C. The Current Standing of Sexual Violence in International Law: a Review 
of Legal Precedent of Rape in War 
The four Geneva Conventions, the first occurring in 1864 and the fourth 
in 1949, created the current standards for international humanitarian law 
and treatment for victims of war. The Geneva Convention (IV), Article 27 
                                                            
71 Id. at 220. 
72 Rape as a Weapon of War: Accountability for Sexual Violence in Conflict: Hearing 
Before Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
10–11 (2008) (statement of Kelly Dawn Askin, Senior Legal Officer, Open Society 
Justice Initiative), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:45210.pdf [hereinafter Hearing]. 
73 See id. 
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(second paragraph) says, “Women shall be especially protected against any 
attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or 
any form of indecent assault.”74 Just before the 1949 Convention, in 1945 
and 1946 during the prosecution of high-ranking Nazi officials in the 
Nuremburg Trials, the Allies had a chance to expand justice for women who 
had been raped during World War II.75 They drafted a statute that laid out 
the rules for trials and defined the crimes to be tried—but despite the  fact 
that rape had been rampant during the war, the statute did not contain the 
word “rape.”76 
Just after the Nuremburg Trials, the Allies prosecuted Japanese officials 
from 1946 through 1948 in the Tokyo Tribunal.77 The indictment of the 
defendants did list rape as a crime, and the prosecutors convicted Japanese 
leaders of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which included sexual 
atrocities within the definition of the crimes.78 However, the indictment did 
not mention the sexual enslavement of an estimated 200,000 women—
“comfort women”—in the countries that the Japanese Imperial Army 
occupied.79 While neither the Nuremburg Trials nor the Tokyo Tribunal 
explicitly mentioned sexual atrocities, various forms of sexual violence 
were documented and entered into evidence during these trials. Thus, some 
sexual atrocities were contained in the judgments even though they were not 
emphasized, and many sex crimes, including mass rape, were left out.80 
After the 1949 Geneva Convention, almost fifty years passed before 
another court used international law to prosecute rape as a war crime or a 
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crime against humanity.81 In the interim, dictators, warlords, and armed 
groups around the world committed murder and mass sexual atrocities on 
civilians without being held accountable for their actions.82 Mass rape has 
proven to be an exceptionally effective tool in a strategy to control, 
terrorize, or destroy an opposing group. Since the end of World War II, 
women (and sometimes men) have been repeatedly gang-raped or sexually 
enslaved en masse in Burma, Cambodia, Bangladesh, East Timor, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Colombia, 
Guatemala, Peru, Argentina, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Darfur, and Congo; 
still, this list is not exhaustive.83 
In the early 1990s during the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Serbian 
army used mass rape as a strategic tool against Bosnian Muslim women.84 
The UN created the ICTY in 1993,85 and in 1996 the ICTY indicted eight 
men for crimes against humanity, breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and 
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War, based solely on acts of sexual 
violence.86 This was the first time that sexual assaults were prosecuted on 
their own as torture and enslavement crimes against humanity.87 
Two years later, in 1998, rape as a crime against humanity gained further 
ground when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found 
Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor, “guilty of nine counts of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.”88 The conviction was significant 
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because it was the first time an international court punished sexual violence 
in a civil war, the first time rape was named as both a crime against 
humanity and a war crime, and the first time that rape was found to be an 
act of genocide.89 The Akayesu case at the ICTR, along with two cases at 
the ICTY involving sexual atrocities, were ongoing in 1998 when 
deliberations took place in Rome over the drafting of the Statute for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). These cases created a permanent 
change in the law influencing the gender provisions of the Statute.90 The 
Rome Statute for the ICC explicitly enumerates “rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization as both 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.”91 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), established in 2002, took 
into account the language of the Rome Statute and then went further than 
the statutes for the ICTY and the ICTR, which had only included “rape” as 
a crime against humanity.92 The statute for the SCSL mentions “rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and any other form of 
sexual violence” as crimes against humanity.93 Before the creation of the 
SCSL, the UN adopted two resolutions that spoke directly to women’s 
issues in war. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, passed in 2000, 
“reaffirmed the critical role of women in peace-building and reconstruction, 
and urged parties to protect women and girls from gender-based 
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violence.”94 This was the first time that the Security Council acknowledged 
that war can have a different effect on women than it can on men.95 
Most recently, in 2008, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1820, which focused on sexual violence in armed conflict. In this 
resolution, the Security Council recognized for the first time that sexual 
violence is a tactic used in war and armed conflict and that it is not 
“collateral damage” from war—it is instead a deliberate and criminal act 
that impacts international peace and security.96 Additionally, in February 
2010, the Secretary General appointed Margot Wallström as the first UN 
Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.97 According to Ms. 
Wallström, “sexual violence in conflict has become the weapon of choice. 
The reason is as simple as it is wicked—because it is cheap, silent and 
effective.”98 
III. THE GLOBAL USE OF CONFLICT MINERALS AND RECENT US 
LEGISLATION COMBATTING THE CONFLICT MINERAL TRADE 
As evidenced by the reigns of King Leopold II and General Mobutu, 
Congo’s resource-wealth has paradoxically brought the Congolese people 
not wealth, but rather, incredible suffering. The conflict minerals currently 
mined in Congo are no exception to this pattern. The electronics industry is 
one of the primary buyers of the four main minerals mined in Congo: tin, 
tantalum, tungsten (“the three Ts”), and gold.99 Electronics companies use 
“the three Ts” and gold in mobile phones, laptops, and other electronics.100 
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“Tin is used as a solder in circuit boards; tantalum goes into capacitors, 
[which are] small components used to store electricity; tungsten is used in 
the vibrating function of mobile phones; and gold is . . . used . . . as a 
coating for wires.”101 
The original causes for the conflict in Congo—land, ethnic identity, 
power, and wealth—are complex issues that are still at play. However, the 
main fuel that allows the violence to continue is the roughly “$180 million a 
year from trading in minerals.”102 In 2010, President Kabila suspended all 
mining operations to give the Congolese army a chance to stabilize the 
area.103 However, the Congolese army is not one cohesive group, but 
instead a conglomeration of various factions; thus, some factions left their 
posts and, rather than enforcing the ban on mining, these soldiers adopted 
the same practice as the rebels by taking control of mining operations in 
order to acquire the wealth from outgoing minerals.104 
Rebel groups and breakaway Congolese army groups maintain control 
over mines in eastern Congo and use the millions of dollars of profit each 
year to increase their wealth, keep control of the local populations, and 
continue fighting.105 To make matters worse, world prices for these metals 
have recently begun to increase.106 Consequently, these price increases have 
given armed groups in the eastern Congo even more incentive to fight for 
and maintain control of the mines.107 These groups “compete violently for 
control of the mines, mineral transport, taxation of the minerals, and 
smuggling of the minerals across the border.”108 
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A. The US Conflict Minerals Law 
With the increased awareness that conflict minerals power the world’s 
electronic industry, the international community, specifically the United 
States, has made an effort to change this system. In April 2009, three 
members of Congress introduced a bill aimed at breaking the link between 
resource exploitation and armed conflict.109 The proposed bill required that 
companies trading minerals with Congo or neighboring states disclose mine 
locations and monitor the financing of armed groups in the mineral-rich 
areas of the country.110 That legislation became part of the Wall Street 
Reform bill that President Obama signed into law in July 2010.111 
This new law, known as “the conflict minerals law,” stipulates that any 
company doing business involving minerals must annually disclose if it 
used conflict minerals originating in the DRC or an adjoining country.112 
The law defines conflict minerals as “columbite-tantalite (coltan), 
cassiterite, gold, wolframite or its derivatives, or any other mineral that the 
Secretary of State determines are financing conflict in the DRC or an 
adjoining country.”113 The law applies not just “to electronics companies, 
but to all publicly traded US firms that use” conflict minerals in their 
products.114 Companies must “exercise due diligence on the source and 
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chain of custody” of these minerals, and the law requires an audit from an 
independent source in order to establish proper oversight.115 
The law requires American companies to submit annual reports to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to disclose whether their 
products contain any minerals from Congo or an adjoining country.116 If so, 
the companies must describe what measures they are taking to trace the 
minerals’ origin.117 Companies that report taking no action are not penalized 
under the law, but companies do not have a choice about disclosing—they 
are mandated by law to state on their websites what action they have taken 
or the fact that they have taken no action.118 The consequences are market-
driven, as most consumers do not want to purchase electronics that fund 
mass rape and most companies will not want to have to publicly post 
information about their involvement with conflict minerals.119 
A company may use the label “DRC Conflict Free” if the minerals it uses 
do not “directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in [Congo] or 
an adjoining country.”120 The law defines an armed group as any group that 
has perpetrated serious human rights abuses in the Congo or an adjoining 
country.121 This is potentially a very difficult piece of the law to enforce 
because the government’s own troops are accused of serious human rights 
abuses, and the government is probably not as likely to enforce the law 
against itself. Nevertheless, this definition is crucial to the conflict mineral 
law’s power because it is applicable to all the different armed groups 
perpetrating human rights abuses in Congo. 
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If a company cannot ascertain that its minerals are conflict free, it must 
still include in its report “the country of origin of the mineral(s), and the 
efforts [taken] to determine the mine or location or origin with the greatest 
possible specificity.”122 The purpose of this process is to compel companies 
to determine what mines their minerals are coming from even if they cannot 
certify that their minerals are conflict free. 
In addition to the mineral companies’ obligations, the conflict minerals 
law also imposes obligations on the US government to take steps toward 
ending the impunity of armed groups in the Congo.123 The law requires the 
secretary of state to submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional 
committees that addresses the link between armed groups in the Congo and 
human rights abuses.124 Some of the requirements that the strategy must 
include are: (1) to provide guidance to companies that are willing to 
exercise due diligence and formalize their own chain of custody between 
their suppliers and their customers; (2) to provide a descriptive plan “of 
punitive measures that could be taken against individuals or entities whose 
commercial activities are supporting armed groups and human rights 
violations” in Congo; and (3) to “produce a map of mineral-rich zones, 
trade routes, and areas under the control of armed groups in [the Congo] 
and adjoining countries.”125 The law designates this map as the “Conflict 
Minerals Map” and requires it to be made available to the public.126 
Additionally, mines that are located in areas under the control of armed 
groups in the Congo and adjoining countries must be depicted on the map 
and designated as “Conflict Zone Mines.”127 The secretary of state is 
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charged with updating the map no less frequently than once every 180 days 
until the conflict in the Congo ends or the SEC changes the requirement.128 
1. Comparing the Conflict Minerals Law with the Past Success of the 
Kimberley Process 
Activists who worked to make this law a reality hope that it will lead to 
an international system for curbing the trade of conflict minerals similar to 
the way the Kimberley Process slowed the sale of “blood diamonds” from 
West and Southern Africa.129 The Kimberley Process began in 2000 “when 
Southern African diamond-producing states met in Kimberley, South Africa 
. . . to discuss ways to stop the trade in [conflict, or blood diamonds] and 
ensure that diamond purchases were not funding violence.”130 The United 
Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution in support of an 
international certification scheme for rough diamonds, and in 2002 an 
agreement between governments, the international diamond industry, and 
civil society organizations created the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (KPCS), which controls rough diamond production and trade.131 
While there are criticisms of the Kimberley Process, it has successfully 
decreased the amount of conflict diamonds in the world market. “Diamond 
experts estimate that conflict diamonds now represent a fraction of 1 
percent of the international trade in diamonds, compared to estimates of up 
to 15 [percent] in the 1990’s [sic].”132 Additionally, the KPCS has helped 
stabilize some countries and has lent support to their development.133 For 
example, approximately $125 million of diamonds were legally exported 
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from Sierra Leone in 2006, compared to almost no legal export of diamonds 
from the country at the end of the 1990s.134 
The Congo is a participating country in the Kimberley Process.135 During 
the 1990s, armed groups in the Congo used diamonds to fund their 
campaigns.136 However, after UN sanctions to ban armed groups in the 
Congo from trading in conflict diamonds and the establishment of the 
Kimberley Process, diamonds no longer provided revenue to fund armed 
groups.137 International monitoring groups have shown that armed groups in 
Congo today do not receive funds from the trade in conflict diamonds.138 
While the Congo produces approximately 8 percent of the world’s 
diamonds today, the armed groups in the Congo no longer receive major 
funding from the illegal diamond trade.139 Ironically, the end of the civil 
war in 1999 in the Congo led to relative stability and a renewal in the 
mining industry within the country, which then laid the foundation for the 
conflict minerals trade.140 Conflict minerals have now taken the place of 
conflict diamonds as a source of funding for armed groups in Congo. 
Ideally, the US conflict minerals law will follow a similar path to the 
Kimberley Process and become the model for global regulation of conflict 
minerals. Tracing the path of conflict minerals from the mine to the supplier 
to the consumer is one of the best ways to begin cutting off funding to the 
armed groups that control conflict mineral mines. Without funding, the 
armed groups would have to make different decisions, such as (1) 
disbanding, (2) negotiating, or (3) returning to their military units. The 
conflict minerals law has the support of both conservative and liberal 
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American politicians. According to Representative Jim McDermott, “[t]his 
is one of those issues that is below the radar for about 99.9 percent of 
Americans. . . . Everyone has their cellphone [sic] up against their ear, 
nobody is thinking of Congo or conflict minerals. But everybody’s got 
some (conflict mineral), potentially, right next to their ear.”141 
2. Criticisms of the Conflict Minerals Law 
The aim of the conflict minerals law is to create a stable mining sector in 
Congo by keeping money out of the hands of armed groups and increasing 
the availability of DRC conflict free minerals.142 The SEC “is responsible 
for developing the reporting requirements for companies covered by the US 
legislation,” and it is currently determining how much influence these 
regulations will have on companies that buy and sell conflict minerals.143 
Many companies are lobbying against strong regulations and in March 
2011, the US Chamber of Commerce, the nation’s largest business lobby, 
criticized the SEC for its current proposal, calling the current rules 
“burdensome and difficult, if not impossible, to comply with.”144 
Many companies that trade in conflict minerals argue that strict 
requirements under the conflict minerals law will unduly burden industry 
and harm American competitiveness, and they are currently lobbying for 
more flexible rules that include a transition process until 2015 so that 
businesses can set up the infrastructure needed to meet the new 
requirements.145 The fight is currently a hot one. In their letter to the SEC in 
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March 2011, two of the initial supporters of the law, Senator Dick Durbin 
and Representative Jim McDermott, urged the SEC to finalize its rules 
without delay, pointing to the fact that the current law is almost a year old 
and many companies have been involved in the conversation for years.146 
At the very least, in order to be effective, the conflict minerals law must 
require proof of clean, transparent supply chains from the Congo mine to 
the consumer.147 This is the heart of the matter that is currently in debate at 
the SEC. In 2009, a report from the London School of Economics (LSE) 
criticized any targeted sanctions (e.g., certification process) as likely to fail 
for a number of reasons, including (1) a paper trail was not likely to exist in 
the Congo, and (2) any sanctioned mine operator would be swiftly replaced 
with another and thus the sanction would have no effect.148 
While the report offers an  approach that it considers a realistic one, it 
suggests that a promising option to further understand the Congo mineral 
conflict issue is to partner a well-resourced Congolese investigative unit 
with a specialized international crime unit.149 The apparent contradiction 
between the Congo’s alleged inability to keep a paper trail and the 
suggested creation of a “well-resourced investigative unit” within the 
Congo does not seem to inhibit the report’s authors. Further, the report only 
mentions rape once, in connection to the infamous Bisie mine. The LSE 
report states that while incidents of rape have occurred, they have been 
irregular and have not been used as a “systematic means of intimidation.”150 
In making this claim, the report cites to another paper co-written by one of 
the same authors of the LSE report, and states that the exploitation of 
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minerals in Walikale territory would occur in both war and peacetime 
conditions.151 Given the incidents of mass rape that occurred in Walikale in 
2010, this statement has little foundational support. 
Additional criticism of the conflict minerals law came in an August 2011 
op-ed in the New York Times by freelance journalist and blogger David 
Aronson, who criticized the Dodd-Frank Act as having “unintended and 
devastating consequences” on local mining towns and small-scale mineral 
purchasers in eastern Congo.152 Aronson asserted that the conflict minerals 
law passed because of the work of high-profile groups like Global Witness 
and the Enough Project, but that local Congolese miners, high-level traders, 
mining companies, and civil society leaders are unanimous in their 
condemnation of the US law that has now created an informal embargo on 
mining.153 Additionally, Aronson stated that “[t]he Chinese have recently 
opened a trading post in North Kivu . . . and they do not feel the need to 
participate in transparency schemes the way Western companies do.”154 
Aronson’s comments reflect common arguments made by opponents of 
the conflict minerals law: it is ineffective, it is the locals who are hurt the 
most, and there will always be someone else (here, the Chinese) who will 
step in and trade in conflict minerals anyway. In his article, Aronson makes 
only one mention of the killings in Congo: when referring to General Bosco 
Ntaganda, whom he calls a “freelance killer [who smuggles] minerals 
across the border to neighboring Rwanda.”155 Aronson does not mention 
rape at all. Opponents to the law often argue that targeting the mines and 
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miners only helps the smugglers, and, interestingly, most opponents do not 
mention the occurrence of mass rape. 
In her response letter to Aronson’s article, Margot Wallström, the UN 
Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, stated that inaction 
is not an option, and that the United States “should be commended for its 
leadership in trying to regulate ‘conflict minerals’ and to starve rebels of the 
resources and weapons they need to kill and rape.”156 In her letter, Ms. 
Wallström acknowledged that implementation of the law needs better 
support from both within and outside Congo, and that shying away from 
this task is not a viable option.157 She stated that “[c]ompanies should 
continue to invest in Congo,” but should include “third-party audits to 
minimize the risk of trading in ‘conflict minerals’” so that Congo’s 
civilians, not its rebels, can profit from its mineral resources.158 Finally, Ms. 
Wallström noted that the women she had “met in eastern Congo want an 
end to the war,” and that “[o]ne way [to end a war] is to make it less 
profitable.”159 
B. Carrying a Piece of Congo in Our Pockets: Our Collective 
Responsibility to End the Conflict Minerals Trade 
The minerals discussed in this article have become a cornerstone of 
modern society because of their presence in computers, laptops, cell phones, 
video games, etc. As such, this shared interest obligates collective 
responsibility. According to Ms. Wallström, conflict minerals are a part “of 
our daily lives and conveniences, and . . . there is no place to hide from our 
collective responsibility;” nor, she believes, “is there any time to lose when 
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the lives of so many are at stake, and the bodies of women and girls 
continue to be used as fodder in a war fuelled by mineral resources.”160 
The US conflict minerals law is the first of its kind in the world.161 
Despite the difficulties of tracing conflict minerals, European governments 
are pondering taking steps similar to the United States.162 The objective of 
minerals certification is to change the shape of the system “from violence to 
stability, from smuggling to legality, from collapsed state to rebuilding 
state, [and] from private bank accounts to public revenues.”163 Cutting off 
the funding to armed groups who are perpetrating mass rape will not alone 
solve the problem, but it is a crucial piece in the process. John Prendergast, 
sponsor of the Enough Campaign, names minerals certification and 
comprehensive military reform as the two key issues to ending mass rape in 
Congo.164 If the armed groups can no longer make money by controlling the 
mines, they will no longer have the need to control the mines nor the 
incentive to rape and terrorize civilians who live in the mining regions of 
Congo. 
By enacting the conflict minerals bill into law, Congress took the first 
step to end the conflict minerals trade funding the war in Congo. Next, the 
Obama administration must partner with both the Congolese government 
and civil society in order to create a process for conflict minerals that 
effectively ends the funding of armed groups. While there will always be 
criticism of such a process, Ms. Wallström’s argument—that  inaction is not 
an option—is a profound one: to not act is to condone the mass rape and 
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killings that are directly linked to the cell phones and other electronics that 
we all use and carry with us in our daily lives. 
C. Suing a Mining Company as a Possible Means of Accountability for 
Businesses and as a Remedy for Victims 
While the US conflict minerals law is an extremely important step toward 
ending the conflict minerals trade, there are other remedies that could also 
be effective in holding companies responsible for their involvement in 
Congo’s armed conflict. In November 2010, a group of Canadian, British, 
and Congolese NGOs brought suit in a Montreal court on behalf of family 
members of over seventy civilians killed by Congolese troops in 2004.165 
The suit is against a Canadian mining company accused of providing 
logistical support to the Congolese Army.166 While there are no sexual 
violence charges included in this class action, if the case is successful, it 
could open a door for Congolese victims of sexual violence, in conjunction 
with NGOs, to bring suits against their perpetrators. 
According to the British group Rights and Accountability in 
Development (RAID), which collected testimony of many eyewitnesses and 
survivors of the 2004 attack, “multinational companies [that] operat[e] in 
developing countries, [and, in] particular[,] countries in conflict zones . . . 
have an obligation to observe the same standards of conduct and respect for 
international rights as they would in their own jurisdiction.”167 In this 
specific incident, three of the company’s “employees were charged with 
complicity in war crimes [in Congo,] but they were acquitted in June 2007, 
after a military trial which the United Nations said failed to meet 
international standards of fairness.”168 “The company . . . has not denied 
that it supplied trucks and logistical support to help Congolese troops,” but 
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it has argued that it “had no option but to agree to the government’s 
requisition request.”169 
The outcome of this lawsuit could potentially hold companies mining or 
purchasing conflict minerals liable for contributing logistical assistance to 
armed groups that commit war crimes and human rights abuses in the 
Congo. On the other hand, if the lawsuit fails, it could potentially further 
absolve these companies from their involvement in such crimes. 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A DUTY TO HELP 
COMBAT CONGO’S SEXUAL VIOLENCE THROUGH THE INTRA-
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF JUSTICE   
In July 2010, human rights activists from Congo asserted the need to 
establish an international criminal tribunal for the DRC.170 Such a tribunal 
would ideally have both international and Congolese judges and 
prosecutors, and it “would prosecute high-ranking officers, armed group 
leaders, and civilian leaders responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, including sexual crimes.”171 While this is an extremely important 
piece of attaining justice for victims of sexual violence in Congo, the DRC 
government has not yet heeded these requests. Also, despite new legislation 
that the DRC government passed in 2006 to combat sexual violence, groups 
that work with rape victims have not noticed any significant change in the 
reported number of rapes.172 
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Widespread legal justice in the Congo, if it does occur, will likely take 
time. In the interim, sexual violence continues to occur on a massive scale. 
While it is crucial that the international community supports a tribunal for 
Congo and pressures the DRC government to enforce its existing laws, it 
must also work quickly with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
to implement effective projects that tackle both prevention and justice for 
individual victims of sexual violence. In sum, until a tribunal is created, the 
international community could support Congo by creating a functional truth 
and reconciliation system, by helping the Congolese government implement 
its recent sexual violence legislation, and by fully backing local NGOs in 
their work to support victims of sexual violence. 
A. Putting a System in Place and Establishing a Record of Congo’s Human 
Rights Abuses 
The sexual violence in Congo has occurred continuously for the past 
fifteen years throughout the recent developments in international law 
regarding sexual violence. While either an international tribunal or a special 
court (similar to Sierra Leone’s) is possible for the Congo, it is not clear 
when such a tribunal would be created or how many perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity it would be able to prosecute. The ad hoc tribunals for 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and others have faced heavy 
criticism for their inefficiencies and prosecution of just a few perpetrators in 
the face of mass crimes. However, these courts are still relatively new 
concepts that can be continually built upon and improved. The formation of 
a DRC tribunal would be a powerful tool to assist victims in Congo in 
gaining access to justice. 
While a Congo tribunal is an uncertainty, putting in place a system and 
mechanisms that establish a historical record of Congo’s human rights 
abuses would be a beneficial step toward justice for Congo. A truth and 
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reconciliation commission (TRC) existed in the Congo from 2003 through 
2007 to oversee the transition from war to peace; however, the commission 
was severely flawed and was denounced by international NGOs.173 While 
many countries have created TRCs to confront the violence in their 
countries, the feedback and results of these commissions have been mixed. 
Some believe that TRCs are crucial to the process of justice; others do not 
see them accomplishing anything concrete or attaining any real justice. 
Despite the debate over their effectiveness, a TRC for Congo that is 
connected with the UN and the international human rights community could 
be very effective in creating a record of the atrocities in Congo and giving 
the Congolese one more access point to justice. 
Alternatively, the Rwandan government came up with a plan to speed up 
the process of prosecuting the high number of accused Rwandans who 
allegedly took part in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.174 The Rwandan 
government created local courts known as gacaca, which are “based loosely 
on a traditional Rwandan dispute resolution mechanism.”175 These courts 
elected panels of lay judges in local communities who held “public hearings 
to determine what crimes [had been] committed in the community, and then 
[held] trials for all but the most serious genocide crimes.”176 The gacaca 
process holds considerable merit for its concept of a culturally adapted and 
popular judicial mechanism.177 However, these courts excluded any crimes 
committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which became the 
government in 1994 after the genocide, and this arguably created the 
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impression of “victor’s justice.”178 Also, the gacaca process raises 
legitimate concerns as to whether local courts, unchecked by other, higher 
courts outside the region, can contribute to an effective, unbiased 
reconciliation in order to help build peace.179 
The successes and failures behind past truth and reconciliation 
commissions and the Rwandan gacaca process could be informative for the 
people of Congo to develop their own judicial institution that promotes 
accountability and encourages public dialogue. However, these are methods 
that need stability to flourish, and they could only be developed and 
implemented in a post-conflict environment. For Congo, post-conflict 
stability is not yet a reality. 
B. Congo’s New Sexual Violence Legislation and the Search for Local 
Justice 
In 2006, the DRC introduced new legislation to combat sexual violence, 
“[raising] the age of consent from sixteen to eighteen and [repealing] a 
previous law that allowed those convicted of rape to pay a fine in return for 
a lighter sentence.”180 Moreover, it increased the prison sentence to a range 
of 5–20 years, included a fine of at least 100,000 Congolese francs (about 
$3,000 USD) and it allowed for a sentence of life imprisonment if the 
victim dies.181 The law specifically criminalized acts such as sexual 
mutilation and sexual slavery, and rapists who are public officials, who 
attack a victim in a group, or who use or threaten to use a weapon, face 
double penalties under the law.182 
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Despite the new law, when Congolese courts in North Kivu Province 
deliver these verdicts, few people trust that there will be actual 
repercussions for a convicted person.183 Data from the Provincial 
Commission for the Fight Against Sexual Violence show that the number of 
rapes reported in North Kivu in 2009 was 4,026—lower than the 4,820 
rapes reported in 2008, despite evidence that the number of rapes has 
actually increased.184 The father of a fourteen-year-old girl who was raped 
in Goma told a reporter that perpetrators are often released from jail a few 
months after their convictions, despite the new law.185 The father claimed 
that some rapists return to harass the family of their victim, and he could not 
see a reason to lose time and money unnecessarily by going to a court to 
seek justice.186 Based on this, it is clear that those who are working to 
change both the effectiveness of Congolese laws and society’s acceptance 
of their ineffectiveness need much more support from the global 
community. 
C. The Congo’s Eastern Region, the Armed Groups Fighting there, and the 
UN’s Effort and Failure to Prevent Mass Rape Amidst the Conflict 
Since the conflict in the Great Lakes region of Congo began in 1996,187 
“tens of thousands of women and girls” (and a smaller number of boys and 
men) have been raped in the country.188 The exact number, or even a precise 
approximation, is unknown because victims often are too scared or ashamed 
to come forward, or are simply unable to access health centers or other 
assistance programs.189 “According to one estimate, less than 50 percent of 
women who are raped are able to access health centers” and thus do not 
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report their rapes.190 Since the conflict began, over 200,000 rapes have been 
reported,191 so it is a fair assumption that the actual number is much higher. 
Despite the millions of deaths and mass rape spanning over a decade in the 
Congo, the international community (aside from the UN) has largely 
remained unconcerned. However, a critic’s argument that the violence is an 
internal issue within the Congo is completely undermined—especially when 
one stops to consider that proceeds from the sale of the critic’s laptop 
directly provided funding to the armed groups. 
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) is the world’s largest peacekeeping force 
with over 18,000 troops.192 Despite its size, the UN troops have been unable 
to prevent armed groups from murdering and mass-raping civilians in the 
eastern region of Congo, mainly in the North and South Kivu Provinces. 
North Kivu (where Walikale territory is located) borders Uganda and 
Rwanda to the east and touches the northern tip of Lake Kivu on the 
province’s southern end. On its northeast edge, South Kivu runs along Lake 
Kivu and then borders Rwanda and Burundi before meeting the shores of 
Lake Tanganyika. These two provinces, home to around ten million 
Congolese,193 bear most of the weight of Congo’s conflict. 
In June 2010, there were approximately 21,000 UN troops in the country, 
but President Kabila of Congo requested that the UN downsize the force 
and remove it completely by October 2011.194 In its final resolution of 
MONUSCO’s mandate for the 2010–2011 year, the Security Council 
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emphasized the role of the UN in Congo as a supportive one, stating that the 
UN was there upon explicit request from the Congolese government. Thus, 
its main roles were to assist with army training, to help displaced people 
return to their homes, and to halt the process of armed groups procuring 
wealth from profitable mineral resources.195 While supporting the 
Congolese government is potentially the best way to reach stability, a 
supportive role does present difficulty, in part because of the factional 
nature of the Congolese armed forces. 
The structure of armed groups within the Congo is fluid and difficult to 
define, and groups often split and merge depending on alliances. The three 
major armed groups are: the Congolese army, called the Forces Armées de 
la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC); the mainly ethnically 
Hutu guerilla group Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR), who are Rwandan; and the loosely-organized Mai-Mai fighters.196 
In 1998, the Mai-Mai joined forces with Congolese government forces to 
fight the FDLR, but since then, the Mai-Mai have split into different 
factions with separate leaders, and they frequently clash with Rwandan 
rebels, Congolese government troops, UN peacekeepers, and even other 
Mai-Mai groups.197 
In an effort to stabilize the region, the Congolese Army integrated certain 
rebel groups into its fold; however, these rebel groups did not give up their 
systems of oppressive taxation, mineral exploitation, and rape.198 Thus, 
while many former rebels are now Congolese soldiers, they remain a danger 
and continue to threaten and rape civilians as they exploit the mineral 
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wealth in the region.199 The prevalence of former rebels who become 
Congolese soldiers and continue to endanger civilians has further 
complicated the UN’s efforts to work with the Congolese government to 
improve the situation.200 
In 2009, the UN developed and released its Comprehensive Strategy to 
Combat Sexual Violence, and the DRC government endorsed it.201 The 
Comprehensive Strategy was the result of an extensive consultation process 
between the DRC government, the UN, international NGOs, and Congolese 
advocacy groups working against sexual violence.202 MONUSCO also 
developed a Sexual Violence Unit to help the DRC government implement 
the Comprehensive Strategy.203 The main goal of the Comprehensive 
Strategy was to support the DRC government and local Congolese groups 
and associations in their efforts to combat sexual violence. However, as 
described in the introduction of this article, the mass rape that occurred in 
Walikale territory in 2010, a year after the Comprehensive Strategy was 
implemented, indicates that the international community must take more 
than just a supportive role in its effort to stop mass rape in the Congo. 
Although the UN maintains that the Congolese Army has the primary 
responsibility of protecting civilians, the incidents of mass rape in Walikale 
were an embarrassment for the UN, which has been present in the region for 
over ten years, has spent billions of dollars in creating its Comprehensive 
Strategy, and has appointed a Special Representative for the Secretary 
General on Sexual Violence.204 Yet, despite all of this, the UN has been 
unable to stop such atrocities.205 
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D. Recommendations from Local Congolese Human Rights Activists on 
How to Effectuate Meaningful Change 
In the Congolese social structure, men hold power over women, and that 
makes it difficult for women’s voices to be heard, especially when a subject 
as difficult as rape is involved. In some areas, when a young woman is 
raped, her father will sit down with the rapist’s family and the village elders 
and will receive the equivalent of a dowry payment—a few cows, goats, or 
sheep.206 While this may offer closure to the men in both families by 
allowing them to avoid scandal and an ineffective justice system, it is often 
harmful to the rape victim.207 In a situation like this, there is no space for a 
woman or girl’s voice or rights, and this greatly hinders her ability to 
recover. 
Eugene Buzake, a lawyer for the NGO Synergy for Judicial Assistance 
(Synergy) in Goma, eastern Congo, says that these types of settlements do 
not benefit the victim for several reasons. First, victims are usually isolated 
and are not permitted to participate in negotiations. Second, the settlements 
do not allow for consideration of serious health and psychological 
problems. The agreements therefore promote victims’ silence by not 
providing sufficient assistance. Finally, these agreements impart a message 
to rapists that it is acceptable to commit rape as long as they have the means 
to pay for it.208 Therefore, victims of sexual violence in Congo face a 
challenging path to achieve justice that is structured to fit their needs within 
their social structure. If a woman decides to seek justice for being raped, she 
must overcome a lack of rape-support resources (in most regions), an 
ineffective judicial system, and a culture that focuses primarily on the honor 
and needs of men at the expense of women. 
While the United States works to implement its conflict minerals law 
from outside the Congo’s borders, there are practical steps that the 
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Congolese government can take—and that the international community 
should help local activists demand—in order to structure an effective justice 
system that will assist victims of sexual violence and prevent continuous 
mass and gang rapes. Justine Bihamba, director of Synergy in Goma, 
suggests that soldiers in the Congolese Army should be paid directly 
through bank withdrawals; currently, most soldiers have corrupt supervisors 
who take two-thirds of their salaries, leaving the soldiers with only one-
third of their pay.209 Ms. Bihamba believes that this simple step would 
reduce the amount of looting and rape committed by government 
soldiers.210 Additionally, Ms. Bihamba suggests that the government create 
more local tribunals, separate from the military courts that are currently in 
charge of prosecuting sexual violence crimes, in order for rape victims to 
seek justice.211 Currently, in North Kivu Province there are an estimated 
five million people but only three local tribunals.212 
In 2004, President Joseph Kabila referred the conflict in eastern Congo to 
the ICC, and in September 2009, the ICC’s “first case that included the 
charge of wartime rape went to trial.”213 So far, “[t]wo alleged Congolese 
rebel commanders . . . have been charged with rape as a war crime and a 
crime against humanity.”214 President Kabila’s referral showed that he was 
willing to have international law prosecute human rights crimes in Congo. 
If the Congolese government is willing to involve international law in its 
internal conflict, then acting to combat corruption and pay soldiers 
directly—as Ms. Bihamba suggests—seems like a feasible step that the 
government should also be willing to take to decrease the number of rapes. 
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Additionally, with three local tribunals in North Kivu already in existence, 
creating more would be a feasible act that the government could perform 
immediately. 
However, reports of government troops raping and terrorizing civilians 
show that impunity continues to prevail and that the international 
community must do everything possible to force the Congolese government 
to confront the problem and punish any soldiers who commit war crimes. 
Justine Bihamba, the aforementioned director of Synergy, reported that in 
2007, government soldiers broke into her house and terrorized her children 
while she was not at home.215 They kicked one daughter in the face, 
knocking out a tooth, and sexually assaulted another daughter; they told Ms. 
Bihamba’s children that they were on a “well-defined” mission.216 The men 
were identified and Ms. Bihamba filed a legal complaint, but the men were 
never arrested and have repeatedly threatened Ms. Bihamba and her 
children since the attack.217 The attack on Ms. Bihamba’s family and the 
mass rapes recently perpetrated by government soldiers are only two 
examples of the impunity that government soldiers experience. 
Recently, however, there have been positive signs that international 
attention and pressure on the DRC government has begun to have some 
effect. In February 2011, a military court in eastern Congo found Lieutenant 
Colonel Kibibi Mutware “guilty of crimes against humanity for sending his 
troops to rape, beat up, and loot the population of a village called Fizi.”218 
Mutware was a former rebel “who joined the [Congolese] army as part of a 
peace agreement in 2009.”219 The Court sentenced Mutware to twenty years 
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in jail and sentenced eight other officers who had served under Mutware to 
a term of imprisonment between ten and twenty years.220 The Court also 
stated (but did not order) that the government “should pay compensation to 
the more than sixty women who were raped . . . in Fizi.”221 
Forty-nine women came to testify at the Court, and Mutware’s conviction 
was the first of a commanding officer for rape in eastern Congo.222 In 
addition to the uncommon conviction, it was also unusual to have such a 
large number of women agree to testify that they had been raped.223 A DRC 
military court convicting a commanding officer of rape indicates that the 
government has begun to address the issue of impunity. Additionally, 
having a large number of women speak openly in court about being raped 
indicates that (1) there may be a new shift in the Congolese culture of 
silence that surrounds rape and sexual violence, and (2) once an outlet exists 
for women to testify about their attacks, they will use it. These convictions 
are encouraging and signal that international law, UN pressure, and media 
coverage have begun to have some effect in assisting victims of mass sexual 
violence in Congo to attain justice. 
Any shift in the pattern of impunity for armed rapists in the Congo cannot 
come too quickly. According to Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without 
Borders), more than seventy victims of rape were treated between January 
19 and February 4, 2011—in two similar incidents to the attack on the 
village of Fizi.224 
E. NGOs’ Work to Provide Medical, Economic, and Empowerment 
Assistance to Victims of Sexual Violence 
There are several organizations, both international and local, that are 
working to help victims of sexual violence in Congo, but their efforts need 
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more support from the wider international community. Survivors of sexual 
violence often have pressing mental and physical health needs, but 
necessary medical and emotional assistance is not available to many victims 
in the Congo. It is crucial that the international community help provide 
resources—medical, psychological, and economic—to organizations that 
are working with survivors of sexual violence in the Congo. This is a basic 
step, and once survivors have sought out medical or psychological support, 
they are more likely to take other steps to seek justice and to prevent future 
atrocities from befalling others. 
The US conflict minerals law provides an effective strategy for drying up 
funding for armed groups and for assisting the Congolese government in 
gaining control of its mines and ending the violence and rapes. However, 
while this process begins in the global market, the global community that 
uses Congo’s resources should become much more involved in assisting 
Congolese organizations and groups that work to prevent mass rape and 
provide services to victims without the government’s assistance. There are 
many organizations that would benefit from this focus. Organizations like 
Synergy provide survivors of sexual violence with micro-grants, legal 
counsel, and community education seminars on civic rights and duties.225 
The South Kivu Women’s Media Association, a nonprofit organization 
cofounded by Congolese journalist Chouchou Namegabe, broadcasts 
graphic, personal testimonies of rape victims and supports women’s 
listening radio clubs.226 Clubs like this are extremely important because 
they reach rural areas of Congo where up to 70 percent of the population 
may be illiterate and where radio may be the only outside source of 
information.227 
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Additionally, the French organization Promotion and Support of 
Women’s Initiatives (PAIF), founded and run by leading human rights 
activist Immaculée Birhaheka, “led the successful campaign to secure 
passage by the parliament [of Congo] of a stringent law on rape in 2006.”228 
PAIF also runs a safe house for women in Goma and “provides programs 
specifically for severely traumatized women, many of whom have been 
rejected by their families, to help them get medical and psychosocial 
support.”229 These are just a few of the organizations within the Congo that 
are striving to improve the situation for victims of sexual violence—there 
are also many individuals and organizations outside the Congo that are 
working to do the same. For example, Reverend Debra Heffner created a 
Congo Sabbath campaign in 2008 in the United States that developed an 
interfaith response to combat violence against women in the Congo by 
sponsoring educational programs and raising funds to provide medical 
services to Congolese women and girls.230 Also, the playwright Lynn 
Nottage wrote a Pulitzer Prize-winning play, Ruined, which speaks to the 
extent that women’s “bodies have become battlefields” in the Congo.231 
It is imperative that more international entities step up and continue to 
combine these efforts with nongovernmental organizations working inside 
Congo. Their work, both within and outside of the Congo, has proven 
effective—both in shifting the situation on the ground and in providing 
services for the victims of sexual violence. Increased support from the 
international community would intensify these efforts and would lead to an 
improved situation for Congolese civilians. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
According to activist Justine Bihamba, women in Congo “are considered 
victims and are not implicated in the search for peace.”232 There are many 
people in Congo who are working to change that, but their task is rife with 
challenges. In order for women in Congo to seek justice for mass sexual 
atrocities, the international community must encourage, hear, and support 
their voices. The human mind tends to strive for coherence and to assert 
order in a story to give it meaning and clarity, often by labeling “good 
guys” and “bad guys.” However, the situation in eastern Congo is too 
complex for these simple labels. The conflict in the Congo has caused 
nearly four million deaths and massive suffering to those left alive.233 Yet, 
it is crucial for individuals and the world community to understand the 
complexity of this multidimensional conflict. 
It is also important for those who hold the conflict in the Congo apart 
from themselves to understand that the laptops they use, the phones they 
carry with them everywhere, or the video games that they most enjoy 
came directly from the Congo. The money spent on these items directly 
funds the armed groups that are currently committing mass atrocities. 
Separating this situation in the Congo from the phones we hold in our hands 
is a dangerous mistake. 
As the author Chimamanda Adichie warns, there is danger in the single 
story: “[A] single story of Africa. A single story of catastrophe. In this 
single story there [is] no possibility of Africans being similar to [us] in 
any way. No possibility of feelings more complex than pity. No 
possibility of a connection as human equals.”234 For fifteen years the 
world has held Congo as a non-event—a single story. The recent scale of 
sexual violence is a twist in the story that has caught media attention, but 
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again the danger is that mass rape is seen as only one story, a story of “the 
Other,” and as such, is completely separate from our lives and our 
humanity. To keep this perspective is to effectuate inaction; to alter this 
perspective is to effectuate meaningful change. 
The single story creates stereotypes. And the problem with 
stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. 
. . . It is impossible to engage properly with a place or person 
without engaging in all of the stories of that place and that person. 
The consequence of the single story is this: It robs people of 
dignity. It makes our recognition of our equal humanity difficult. It 
emphasizes how we are different rather than how we are similar. 
—Chimamanda Adichie.235 
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